In their commentary, The EU’s Playbook for African Minerals Amid China’s Dominance, Poorva Karkare and Karim Karaki (2024) outline the European Union’s (EU) strategy to secure critical raw materials (CRMs) from Africa to counter China’s dominance. While highlighting the EU’s supply chain vulnerabilities, the authors’ Eurocentric framing and paternalistic undertones betray a misstep, casting Africa as a passive resource supplier rather than a strategic partner. Echoing colonial mentalities, this approach, coupled with the EU’s structural weaknesses in mining and refining, undermines its competitiveness. To make a dent, the EU must shed its risk-averse mindset and engage Africa as an equal partner, prioritizing mutual prosperity over extractive control.
The commentary notes China’s China’s control over 60% of lithium refining, 70% of cobalt processing, and 90% of rare earth refining, underscoring the EU’s dependence (European Commission, 2020). Yet, it glosses over the EU’s negligible upstream presence in Africa. European mining firms, bar rare exceptions like Eramet’s limited lithium and manganese operations in Mali and Gabon, avoid African CRMs, favoring safer markets like Australia or Canada (The Economist, 2023). China, meanwhile, invested $4.5 billion in African lithium mines in 2023 (Nedopil, 2024). Karkare and Karaki’s call for partnerships ignores this gap, rendering the EU’s ambition to “de-risk” from China unrealistic.
The EU’s midstream weakness is equally stark. The Critical Raw Materials Act (CRMA) targets processing 40% of CRMs by 2030, but Europe’s Europe’s refining capacity remains embryonic, with projects like Northvolt’s battery plant years from maturity (European Commission, 2024). China’s integrated refining dominance, built on scale and lax standards, leaves the EU trailing (Seaman, 2024). The commentary’s focus on technical assistance sidesteps this, offering no path to close the midstream gap.
Exploration, the bedrock of future supply, further exposes the EU’s inertia. Unlike China’s state-backed ventures or Australia’s junior miners, European investors shun African exploration due to perceived governance risks (Dempsey, 2023). Data on EU exploration is scarce, with London’s mining finance hub showing minimal capital flows to African CRMs (Afripoli, 2024). Without upstream investment, the EU’s strategic vision falters.
The commentary’s paternalistic tone is most evident in its framing of EU-Africa partnerships. By emphasizing EU priorities – ESG compliance and supply chain diversification – Karkare and Karaki treat Africa as a resource frontier, echoing colonial-era exploitation (Amoah Awuah, 2019). African nations, from Namibia’s lithium export bans to Zimbabwe’s processing push, demand value addition and industrialization (Karkare & Karaki, 2024). Yet, the EU’s bilateral deals, like those with Namibia, often prioritize European access over African development, fostering mistrust (Afripoli, 2024). The Global Gateway’s $300 billion pledge focuses on export infrastructure, not local beneficiation, reinforcing perceptions of extractive intent (Nedopil, 2024).
This paternalism alienates African partners who seek equal terms. China, by contrast, engages pragmatically, offering $21.7 billion in 2023 for infrastructure and mining without moralizing governance (Nedopil, 2024). Its export controls on gallium and germanium, costing the U.S. $3.4 billion in GDP, show strategic focus, not collaboration (Amgott & Nassar, 2024). The commentary’s call for trilateral EU-China-Africa cooperation ignores these tensions, lacking actionable steps.
The EU’s risk-averse offtake strategy compounds its missteps. European OEMs like BMW avoid African sourcing, citing ESG reputational risks – often perceived, not real – while China secures DRC and Zimbabwe offtakes (The Economist, 2023; Nedopil, 2024). The EU’s insistence on stringent standards deters investment, clashing with African priorities for jobs and growth.
To compete, the EU must partner on equal terms, respecting African agency. First, it should invest boldly in exploration, co-financing projects with African governments to share risks and rewards. Second, secure offtakes with flexible ESG terms, offering long-term contracts to align with African value-addition goals. Third, co-fund regional refining hubs, like a lithium plant in East Africa, with the African Development Bank, building local capacity (Afripoli, 2024). Fourth, support African-led frameworks like the AfCFTA, providing technology and skills training, not conditional aid.
The EU isn’t marginalized by China – it’s simply not playing the same game. China strategizes without the EU in mind; the EU must do the same, presenting a value proposition – market access, green tech, and investment – and letting Africans decide. Karkare and Karaki’s playbook, while insightful, fails to confront the EU’s structural and attitudinal flaws. By embracing equal partnerships, the EU can forge a path in the CRM race, not as China’s rival but as Africa’s ally.
—–
Contributed by:
Evans Rubara, Lead at Africa Transcribe.
